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Abstract. Secure and privacy-preserving management of Personal Health
Records (PHRs) has proved to be a major challenge in modern health-
care. Current solutions generally do not offer patients a choice in where
the data is actually stored, and also rely on at least one fully trusted
element that patients must also trust with their data. In this work, we
present the Health Access Broker (HAB), a patient-controlled service for
secure PHR sharing that (a) does not impose a specific storage loca-
tion (uniquely for a PHR system), and (b) does not assume any of its
components to be fully secure against adversarial threats. Instead, HAB
introduces a novel auditing and intrusion-detection mechanism where its
workflow is securely logged and continuously inspected to provide au-
ditability of data access and quickly detect any intrusions.
Keywords: Access Control, Personal Health Record, Attribute-based Encryp-
tion, Cloud
1 Introduction
Modern healthcare requires access to patient data from diverse sources such as
smart Internet of Things (IoT) health devices, hospitals, and laboratories. Thus,
recent years have seen a move from traditional storage of patient health data
at individual health institutions towards the Personal Health Record (PHR): a
more integrated and patient-centered model with a patient’s data from different
sources all available in one place. Maintaining security and privacy of patient
PHRs is an ongoing research problem, given the large number of data providers
(e.g. pathologists, paramedics) and consumers (e.g. pharmacists, doctors) who
need to access the PHRs in various scenarios. Currently deployed PHR systems
require patients to trust particular commercial providers (e.g. Indivo6) or insti-
tutions such as the government (e.g. My Health Record7 in Australia). Patients
have increasingly opted out of these services because of the need to trust in
6 http://indivohealth.org
7 https://www.myhealthrecord.gov.au
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a particular institution or provider’s security and privacy mechanisms, which
are complicated and sometimes unknown. Breaches of healthcare data [15] have
further eroded patients’ trust in these systems.
A common solution presented in prior research is to develop strong crypto-
graphic access control methods for PHRs stored in public clouds [12]. Records
can be encrypted by patients before uploading to untrusted cloud services. How-
ever, these methods demand significant management and computing overhead
from data owners. Moreover, some elements, such as key management servers,
are still fully trusted, and users do not have a choice in terms of where to store
their data. Thus, the users may not be comfortable with this solution.
In this paper, we present Health Access Broker (HAB), a secure PHR man-
agement system that provides the users with full control of where their data
is stored. HAB assumes that any of its components may be compromised, and
introduces a novel auditing and intrusion-detection mechanism to handle it. Pa-
tients encrypt their PHRs under a secure attribute-based encryption scheme,
specify an access policy, and pass them to HAB, which acts as an intermediate
service to upload the data to the public cloud services of the patients’ choice.
The data is split across multiple cloud services as an added layer of security, such
that any one share of the data is meaningless on its own. When another user
wants to access a patient’s record, HAB checks the access policy and retrieves
and aggregates the data for the user, who then decrypts it using their key. Access
to data is immediate as there is no patient involvement in the retrieval process.
Compared to existing services, HAB is more likely to be trusted by patients
for two reasons. Firstly, it does not locally store patient data or users’ encryp-
tion keys, and therefore cannot decrypt and view the data. Secondly, HAB’s
workflow and all user-HAB communication is securely logged (e.g. on a private
blockchain). To protect against adversarial threats, HAB actions are continu-
ously compared with client requests to ensure that an adversary (e.g. a system
administrator) cannot initiate any data management operations not requested
by an authorised user. Because of continuous inspection of the logs, any other
events indicating HAB compromise can be also be detected and handled quickly.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines related work
in the area. Section 3 describes the system architecture and algorithms, and
security model. In Section 4, we evaluate performance of a prototype implemen-
tation, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Prior research on securing health data in public clouds has taken two kinds of
approaches that inspire our current work: (i) access to cloud data via a trusted
middleware, and (ii) cryptographically-enforced access control.
The first category of work uses a model that has been popular in commercial
cloud-computing solutions: the cloud access broker [18], a trusted middleware
between the users and the cloud which manages user interaction with cloud
services and enforces access control. For example, Wu et al. [21] propose the use
of a broker service for aggregation of patient health records stored on different
clouds by various health providers. The focus of their work is an algorithm
for aggregating records from different organisations given that each follows a
different schema. This makes it orthogonal to our work, in which the key job
of the broker service is access control and security of health data. [16] also
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implements middleware for managing retrieval and access control for electronic
health records (EHRs) on a commercial cloud service. They use existing third-
party services to manage data storage and access control and encryption, and
implement the middleware themselves. Thus, users of the system will need to
trust these third-party services. In our work, we propose a model that does not
require trusting a specific provider, as users may store their records anywhere.
Access control based on Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) is a commonly
used method in prior work (e.g., [10,9]) due to the fine granular control it offers
and its flexibility over traditional access control methods such as Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC). For instance, Yu et al. [23] proposed a system where
a key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) scheme is used to encrypt data with a set of at-
tributes before uploading it to the untrusted cloud. Each user possesses a key
representing their access policy, and only the users whose access policy matches
a file’s attributes can decrypt the file. User revocation is handled by the cloud
service using proxy re-encryption.
ABE has also been proposed for the eHealth domain [7,13,12,6,20,17,5].
Greene et al. [7] use KP-ABE to restrict access to health data, and additionally
incorporate hash-chaining for time-based access control; however the scenario
is different from ours and deals with data sharing from smart health devices
to a cloud database. Narayan et al. [19] use ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE)
to secure PHRs in a centralised cloud server and also allow for keyword search
over encrypted records. [22] improves Narayan et al.’s work by adding fault
tolerance, efficient local decryption, and making the keyword search much more
lightweight. A key drawback of both schemes is the heavy workload expected
from the patient, who needs to take care of access grants/revokes, data uploads,
and update approvals. In our work, we propose a broker service that manages
most of these tasks; the minimal set of tasks a patient needs to perform can be
done through an easy-to-use mobile application.
3 Health Access Broker
Our proposed architecture is shown in Figure 1. There are three categories of
HAB users: patients and trusted contacts (e.g. primary carers – henceforth re-
ferred to as just patients), who control the data that is entered into a patient’s
health record and determine access policies for it; Data Requestors (DRs), which
may include doctors, analysts, or anyone wishing to view a patient’s data; and
Data Providers (DPs), usually medical personnel that may add to a patient’s
health record. Users interact with the HAB controller through a web-based user
interface (UI). In addition, there is a mobile application for patients and a desk-
top application for medical personnel that must be used to perform particular
tasks which cannot be directly performed on the web-based UI for security rea-
sons. To avoid a single point of failure and for quick fault localisation, HAB
comprises multiple brokers, each of which contains the same functionality but
will in practice be deployed at a different server responsible for a different set
of patients. Each user connecting to the HAB controller through the UI will be
allocated to the relevant broker which will handle all data operations requested
by the user.
Each broker comprises the following three modules:
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Fig. 1. Health Access Broker architecture
1. The Data Storage, Retrieval And Update Module is responsible for indexing
and storing data with external cloud providers as well as retrieving portions
of data requested by users.
2. The Authentication and Access Control Module is responsible for managing
user authentication and access policies, including storing policy specifica-
tions, enforcing policies, updating policies and user access revocation.
3. The Key Management Module manages key generation, distribution and
update, and stores the keys used for the encryption scheme under which
patient data is protected.
A HAB Inspector (HI) that is external to the brokers ensures HAB security
based on two components, a Gatekeeper and a Brokers’ Log (details below).
3.1 The HAB Workflow
HAB’s workflow can be divided into four key functions that we describe below.
User Registration and Authentication A first-time HAB user initiates a reg-
istration request through the HAB UI and chooses a username and password
combination for future authentication. The UI assigns the user to a particular
broker. The broker invokes its Key Management Module (KMM) to issue a key
to the user. Existing users enter their username and password into the UI, which
assigns them to a particular broker. The broker invokes its Authentication and
Access Control Module (AACM) to authenticate the user.
Data Upload and Update A DP who wants to upload data enters the patient’s
identifying information and the data itself into a desktop application, which
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encrypts the data and sends it to HAB. HAB sends the data to the patient’s
mobile app for review. The patient reviews and approves the data, sets an access
policy for it, and specifies a list of cloud-based storage locations for it. The app
encrypts it under an encryption scheme using the access policy and sends the
encrypted data and its access policy back to HAB. The data is received by the
Data Manager Module (DMM) of the broker that the patient is assigned to. The
DMM passes the data to the Multi-Cloud Proxy (MCP), which in turn runs
a data splitting algorithm and stores each chunk of data in one of the storage
locations chosen by the patient. The access policy is passed to the Access Control
and Authentication Module (AACM) for storage. Data update process is very
similar, except that it begins with an additional searching step to retrieve the
portion of a health record that is to be updated. Although data upload/update
will be delayed until patient approval, this is to ensure data integrity. The delay
is acceptable because data upload is not usually an urgent matter.
Data Retrieval An authenticated Data Requestor (DR) makes a request for a
particular data item belonging to a particular patient, which is passed to the
DMM. The DMM invokes the AACM, which checks whether the DR satisfies
the access policy specified by the patient for the requested data. If the check
is successful, the DMM requests the MCP for the required data, which in turn
runs the retrieval algorithm to combine the chunks of data stored across multiple
clouds and returns the data to the DMM. If the check is unsuccessful, the DR
may send a request to the patient to update their access policy and allow access.
HAB would also provide emergency access for hospital emergency rooms
(ERs) urgently requiring a patient’s data. We propose using a symmetric encryp-
tion scheme where all hospitals using HAB possess an emergency public/private
key pair. When a hospital ER requests a patient’s data, HAB uses proxy re-
encryption to re-encrypt it with the hospital’s public key. The ER staff can then
decrypt the received data with the hospital’s private key.
Auditing and Intrusion Detection Existing work in securing cloud-based PHRs
generally assumes at least one fully trusted element, for key management or
other important functions. Our work is set apart by the fact that while HAB
is a trusted entity, it is strictly audited to protect against compromise. HAB’s
auditing mechanism comprises a Gatekeeper, a Brokers’ Log (BL) and a HAB In-
spector (HI). The Gatekeeper monitors all communication between a connected
user and a broker, logging all requests made by a user along with the user’s iden-
tifying information and timestamps. The BL is a secure log of all the actions
performed by HAB modules in response to user requests, e.g. data storage or
policy update. The HI runs continuously and matches the Gatekeeper’s logs with
the BL, using a set of intrusion detection rules which specify the fields of the logs
that are to be compared for each event. For example, for a data retrieve event,
it matches the file ID being requested with the file ID being retrieved by HAB.
This is to identify any actions performed by a compromised broker that were not
requested by an authorised user, for example, retrieving additional data to what
is requested. The patient and system admin are both alerted if an instrusion is
detected. We propose that the BL is maintained in a private blockchain accessed
by all brokers in HAB, to ensure its immutability.
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Algorithm 1 Splitting and Uploading File to Clouds
Input: Number of clouds N , Threshold T , Data File F
Output: Chunks Ni stored in clouds Ci
1: Run secret sharing scheme with threshold T on file F to generate shares Si where
i = 1, 2, . . . N
2: for Share Si do
3: Label Si with File ID and Share ID
4: Upload share Si to cloud Ci
5: Store [File ID, Share ID, Ci] in index table
6: end for
3.2 HAB Algorithms
We now outline the specific algorithms or schemes we propose for the following
HAB functions: data splitting for upload, data aggregation for retrieval, and
encryption and revocation. In a practical deployment, HAB’s modular design
allows for easy modification of the algorithms for any of these functions without
affecting the rest of the functionality.
Data Splitting We implement a highly secure data storage algorithm where a
document is first encrypted and then split into N chunks. N is a configurable
parameter representing the number of cloud services that will store the docu-
ment. Each chunk is stored in a different cloud service. We split the document
according to Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme as an added layer of security. A
secret shared under this scheme cannot be reconstructed unless a configurable
threshold T of the N shares become known; any one of the shares is meaningless
on its own. Thus, at least T of the N cloud services will need to collude (or be
compromised by an adversary) for reconstruction of the encrypted version of a
document. This scheme therefore represents an added layer of security in case
of broken encryption or key compromise. Algorithm 1 describes how we apply
Shamir’s scheme to a file and then store chunks of the file in N clouds.
Data Aggregation for Retrieval Once the DMM obtains authorisation from the
AACM to retrieve a file, it runs Algorithm 2 for the retrieval, which retrieves
the chunks of the file from the N cloud services, and then runs the combine
algorithm of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to reconstruct the original file.
Algorithm 2 Reconstructing a File Retrieved from Clouds Ci where i =
1, 2, . . . , N
Input: Threshold T , Shares Si of File F where i = 1, 2, . . . , T , File index table
Output: File F reconstructed from Shares 1, 2 . . . , N stored in Clouds 1, 2 . . . , N
1: From File index table, retrieve Pointers Pi to cloud locations of T shares of File F ,
where i = 1, 2, . . . , T
2: for Each Pointer Pi do
3: Retrieve share Si from Cloud Ci according to Pointer Pi
4: Reconstructed file R = R + Si
5: end for
6: Run secret-combining algorithm on R to obtain File F
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Encryption In PHR applications, the access policy for the data is usually known
at the time of creation of the data, while the identities of the recipients are not
necessarily known. We therefore propose using a Ciphertext-policy Attribute-
based Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme where the attributes of users (e.g. organ-
isation and department) serve as their keys, and the data owner can define an
access policy in terms of the minimum set of attributes a user must possess in
order to be able to decrypt a data file. We currently use the CP-ABE scheme
presented in [1]; a formal definition is omitted owing to space constraints.
A key requirement in PHR encryption is efficient user revocation, i.e. denial
of access to previously authorised users. Most revocation schemes for CP-ABE
rely either on proxy re-encryption, which has a large computational overhead,
or time-based keys, in which case the revocation is not immediate [14]. Instead,
inspired by mediated CP-ABE [8], which allows for immediate revocation by
involving a semi-trusted server in the decryption process, we use the following
simple revocation mechanism. Patients can associate a list of revoked users with
each data item in their health record, as well as a list of users who cannot view
any of their data. When a user makes a data retrieval request for a patient, HAB
(i.e. the AACM) first checks that the user’s access is not revoked generally or
for the requested item, and only then begins the retrieval process. Thus, as our
system already involves an intermediary in data retrieval, we are able to augment
any encryption scheme with immediate and efficient revocation without requiring
any re-encryption or key updates.
For attribute assignment and key generation, we assume that the healthcare
system can be divided into domains when HAB is practically deployed. Each
domain functions as an attribute issuing authority (AIA) that is responsible
for issuing attribute sets(e.g. hospital name, department, specialisation) to the
users in its domain. Each user applies to its AIA for assignment of attributes.
Attributes are drawn from an (extendable) attribute universe that can be defined
as part of a HAB deployment. HAB’s Key Management Module receives these
attributes directly from the AIA through a secure channel when a new user
applies to register with HAB, and issues a key based on them.
3.3 HAB Security
HAB is designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of pa-
tient health data based on a secure-by-design philosophy. Thus, we take adver-
sarial threats into account while defining its basic protocols. Table 1 summarises
these threats. Threats (1-A) to (1-D) correspond to data confidentiality issues;
(2-A) and (2-B) correspond to integrity, and (3-A) and (3-B) correspond to avail-
ability. The table also outlines design decisions to defend against these threats;
note that some defenses are to be dealt with in the deployment rather than the
design stage and are left to a practical deployment.
Some security threats may arise because of users’ lack of security-awareness.
Passwords may be guessed by adversaries or obtained by social engineering at-
tacks, or users may inadvertently set the wrong access policies and allow access
to unintended persons. The first threat can be minimised by requiring strong
passwords and through user education. The second can be handled by design-
ing the patient application such that when setting the access policy for a data
item, no option of a public or allow-all access policy is provided which can be
inadvertently selected by inexperienced users; rather, patients need to specify
particular user attributes required for gaining access.
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Adversarial Threat Design Decision
(1-A) Adversary performs password attacks
to obtain credentials of user authorised to
view a patient’s data, and gains access to
data that he is otherwise not authorised to
view.
A practical deployment will enforce strong
passwords and limit the number of login at-
tempts. In future, we can add anomaly detec-
tion to HAB Inspector and compare a user’s
actions with their normal profile to detect
account misuse.
(1-B) Adversary obtains secret key of an au-
thorised user and uses it to decrypt data.
HAB does not store issued keys; stan-
dard network defenses [2] would be applied
in practice to defend against man-in-the-
middle attacks during key distribution.
(1-C) Two adversaries combine their keys to
decrypt data that neither can decrypt indi-
vidually.
HAB’s CP-ABE scheme is collusion-
resistant [1].
(1-D) Adversary compromises, or colludes
with, the cloud service storing a patient’s
data to directly obtain patient data bypass-
ing HAB’s access control.
Each data item is split across multiple clouds
and cannot be reconstructed until a (con-
figurable) number of shares of the item are
obtained; the adversary cannot realistically
compromise several cloud services.
(2-A) Malicious data provider (DP) deliber-
ately sends inaccurate/false data for upload
into patient’s health record.
No data can be entered into a patient’s
health record without the patient’s review
and approval.
(2-B) An authorised but malicious data
provider (DP) deliberately enters false infor-
mation in an existing record.
Updates must also be patient-approved.
(3-A) Adversary performs Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks on HAB controller.
In a practical deployment, existing well-
known defenses against DoS attacks (e.g.
[11]) should be used to secure HAB servers.
(3-B) Adversary obtains a patient’s creden-
tials (e.g. by password attacks or social engi-
neering) and modifies access policy of files to
deny access to previously authorised users.
Same as (1-A)
Table 1. Adversarial threats and corresponding defenses.
4 Prototype Implementation and Evaluation
File Size
Splitting (s) Encryption (s) Upload (s)
Average Std. Dev Average Std. Dev Average Std. Dev
1 KB 1.5 0.3 1.2 0.5 19.3 2.2
10 KB 3.0 0.7 1.0 0.3 22.4 2.8
100 KB 27.7 6.8 1.0 0.3 69.9 2.3
500 KB 124.0 15.3 0.8 0.1 212.1 6.8
1 MB 363.0 23.7 1.1 0.3 490.0 7.9
Table 2. Running time (in seconds) of HAB operations for different file sizes.
We have implemented a small-scale prototype of HAB and evaluate the la-
tency of common operations. We used Django8 to implement the HAB UI as
a web application and deployed it to a remote9 webserver. We set up HTML
forms in the frontend of the application to provide the basic functionality of
data upload and retrieval (we used Google Drive in our prototype evaluation),
8 https://www.djangoproject.com/
9 www.pythonanywhere.com
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and integrated access control and policy management functions into the Django
backend that integrates an SQLite database. We also wrote Java-based clients
to interact with it to simulate the patient’s mobile app and medical personnel’s
client app; the encryption/decryption and data splitting functionality were part
of these clients. By running the clients after deploying the server, we tested the
latency of common operations for different sizes of data items. We used ran-
dom XML files as data items, as HAB in deployment will use a standardised
XML-based health data exchange format such as HL7 CDA [4].
The results for the operations whose running times vary by file size are sum-
marised in Table 2. The data splitting and encryption operations take place
offline (i.e. on the client device), while the file upload process involves server
interaction. The upload process took approximately 25 seconds for smaller files
(<100 KB) and 43.8 seconds for a 1 MB file; the relatively large running time is
due to authentication and file upload to external cloud services, as well as several
database operations to properly index the uploaded file on the HAB backend.
However, as data upload is generally not urgent, this upload time is acceptable.
For large files, the data splitting process is the most time-consuming operation,
as its running time grows significantly with file size; a 1 KB file required 0.41
seconds to split, but a 1 MB file required 384 seconds. However, this is not a
significant problem for the following reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, data
upload is generally not urgent. Secondly, the splitting operation can be made
optional if file sizes are always large, as the splitting process is just an added
layer of security; if the patient wishes to speed up data upload, they can opt out
of data splitting and choose instead to store the entire file with a single cloud
service. Thirdly, in practical settings, apart from images such as ultrasound or
X-Ray films, most files uploaded will be short text-based documents of a few
pages and thus minimal (<100 KB) in size.
We also tested two revocation operations: first, when a patient wishes to
deny access to their files for a particular user (user revocation), and second, for
a set of users owning a particular attribute (attribute revocation). Both these
operations were completed in only 0.01 seconds. Finally, we tested the running
time of the policy update operation, i.e. if a patient sends a new access policy
to be stored against a particular file. This was completed in 0.74 seconds.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the Health Access Broker (HAB), a PHR-sharing
platform that allows patients total control over their data in terms of where it
is stored and who can access it. Compared to existing solutions, HAB does not
assume any component to be fully trusted or resilient to compromise. Instead,
it deals with possible adversarial threats with a novel auditing and intrusion-
detection mechanism based on continuous logging and inspection of logs. Based
on a prototype implementation, we have shown that common workflows can be
completed in time-frames suitable for real-time and user friendly operation. In
future, HAB’s capabilities can be further extended by incorporating anomaly
detection to detect adversarial use of legitimate user profiles. We will be also
exploring leveraging granular access control solutions such as Function-based
Access Control (FBAC)[3] for HAB.
10 Abaid Z., Shaghaghi A., et al.
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